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The Sultan of Constantinople and the Caliph of Baghdad:  
Military Composition and Centralized Power in the Muslim World, 749–1800 
 
 
Peter del Rosso 
University of Waterloo 
(Waterloo, ON, Canada) 
 
 
In an analysis of military structures pertaining to both the Abbasid Dynasty as well as the 
much later Ottoman Empire, it is quintessential to outline basic recruitment policies of each in 
order to better understand conscription patterns and regions, as well as the overall cohesion of 
their respective armed forces. This paper strives to examine the beginnings of Abbasid armed 
forces, starting with the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate in 749 AD. In order to understand main 
recruitment patterns, regions, ethnicities, and incentives for recruitment, this paper will conduct a 
study of the initial Ottoman military in order to showcase the differences between the two, as 
well as to suggest why the Ottomans enjoyed a supremacy that the Abbasids never held for an 
extended amount of time. 
In studying Abbasid armed forces, it becomes apparent that they were quite juxtaposed to 
Umayyad armies, in that their military was comprised initially of Khurasanian tribesmen acting 
in accordance to the “Persian populace, Muslim and non-Muslim.”1 This can be explained in 
                                                          
1 Wilferd Madelung, Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran (Albany, N.Y.: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988), 8. 
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light of Persian nationalistic sentiments growing in response to Arab domination, especially 
“militant mawali (clients), recent converts to Islam who demanded inclusion in the political 
community (and were followed in this respect by non-Muslim subjects.”2 Indeed, many new 
non-Arab converts to Islam became victims of discrimination at the hands of Arab nationalists, 
which strengthened Abbasid support: “The Abbasids took advantage of, and capitalized on, these 
factors. Through a very well-directed and skillful propaganda and a new ideology, the Abbasids 
managed to concentrate all these anti-Umayyad sentiments in one big group of opposition.”3 This 
discrimination of non-Arabs extended to include taxation, where the beginnings of Abbasid 
armed forces were prodded by heavy taxation of non-Muslim/Arab groups.4 One of the many 
tribes that formed the backbone of Abbasid forces, the Khurasanian, were kept in line with 
Abbasid principles and goals through “commissars on the basis of a code of rules (aman).”5 It is 
curious to note that the troops who secured victory for the Abbasids were called ahl al-dawla, 
hearkening to Persian sentiments of nationalism.6 The nationalistic sentiments of these factors in 
the army can be better understood if one takes into account the limited amount of Arabs there 
                                                          
2 It is also important to note the pressing sentiments for both the Mawali and non-Muslim subject 
population of the Umayyad Dynasty to be incorporated into political communities for access to power, which 
prodded their support for the Abbasid cause; see Said Amir Arjomand, "'Abd Allah Ibn Al-Muqaffa' and the 
'Abbasid Revolution," Iranian Studies 27, no. ¼, (1994): 11. 
 
3 Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "The 'Abbasid Revolution in Central Asia and Khurāsān: an Analytical Study of 
the Role of Taxation, Conversion, and Religious Groups in its Genesis," Islamic Studies 33, no. 2/3 (1994): 227. 
 
4 For the differences in taxation between Arab Muslims, non-Arab Muslims, and non-Muslims in the 
Umayyad Dynasty, see Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "The 'Abbasid Revolution in Central Asia and Khurāsān: An 
Analytical Study of the Role of Taxation, Conversion, and Religious Groups in Its Genesis," Islamic Studies 33, no. 
2/3 (1994): 233-4. 
 
5 Arjomand, "'Abd Allah Ibn Al-Muqaffa' and the 'Abbasid Revolution," 32. 
 
6 Patricia Crone, "The 'Abbāsid Abnā' and Sāsānid Cavalrymen," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 8, no. 
1 (1998): 2. 
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were in the ahl al-dawla.7 It was largely due to Abu-Muslim al-Khurasani that the Khurasanian 
were brought into the Abbasid military, providing essential support at a largely local level, as he 
supported their nationalistic ideals in opposition to growing Arabo-centric sentiments.8 However, 
Khurasanian tribes were not the only Persians to become a factor in the coalition-like Abbasid 
forces: many Persians joined the Shi’ite sect as a way of opposing the Sunni Umayyads, 
revolting in the eastern territories of the empire in coalescence with larger Abbasid movements.9 
These Malawis, outsiders in the Umayyad administration who used the Shi’ite revolts to further 
their political aims, became one of the largest factors in the initial Abbasid armies, gathered from 
the local levels of society.10 
Thus, the Abbasid military was largely comprised of, at least in its formative years, large 
amounts of support from the local level, suggesting that Abbasid practices did not include a 
standing army of professionals.11 Khurasanian troops from Iran played a large part alongside the 
Malawis, who were used by the Abbasids to quell any internal revolts after the creation of the 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 11. Crone analyses the fact that while the Umayyad dynasty favoured the usage of Arabs in the 
military, the Abbasid forces favoured Iranian troops “of whom there was after all a much greater reservoir,” as well 
as “freshly converted dhimmis whose acceptance in the Hashimite army constituted their entry into Muslim 
society.” The recruitment patterns of Abbasid rulers from the time of the revolution onwards therefore follow very 
nationalistic lines of thinking, along with those people at the most local of levels who formed the militias of the 
Dynasty. For more on this, see Crone, "The 'Abbāsid Abnā' and Sāsānid Cavalrymen," 13. 
 
8 Khurasanian support was essential to the victory of the Abbasids and played a vital role in the initial 
formation of Abbasid armies, along with local militias. For more on this, see Roberto Marín-Guzmán, "the 'Abbasid 
Revolution in Central Asia and Khurāsān: an Analytical Study of the Role of Taxation, Conversion, and Religious 
Groups in its Genesis," Islamic Studies 33, no. 2/3 (1994): 239. For more on the prevalent Arabo-centric mentalities 
which prodded many Persians to join the Abbasid army, see Crone, "The 'Abbāsid Abnā' and Sāsānid Cavalrymen,"  
15. 
 
9 Marín-Guzmán, "The 'Abbasid Revolution in central Asia and Khurāsān,” 237-8. 
 
10 Ibid., 239. 
 
11 Here it must be detailed that Abbasid caliphs used the Khurasanian troops in time of war, yet otherwise 
did not employ them on a consistent basis and had them stationed in Iraq, relying instead on locally drawn militias 
for Syrian affairs. For more on this, see Kenneth M. Setton, ed. A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years. 
Vol. 1. (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 82. 
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new dynasty.12 Yet even these could not replace the locally formed militias, drawn from the 
populace when the need arose, that sustained the Abbasid Dynasty once power had been wrested 
from the Umayyads, and who essentially weakened the caliph through their military allegiance to 
their local emirs, called rawabit.13 Indeed, these local militias played a vital role in the Abbasid 
military, as local leaders were “still able to raise armies of up to four thousand horsemen when 
their interests demanded it.”14 These militias were used in greater frequency than Khurasanian 
troops, leading to a dependence on local leaders contributing to field an Abbasid force.15 There 
appears in the Abbasid forces a small percentage of black soldiers, yet their role remained strictly 
secondary, especially with the rise of the Turk.16 Recruitment policies largely hinged upon non-
Arab Muslim (and in some cases, non-Muslim) political endeavours, heavy taxations, and 
nationalistic sentiments from Persia, as well as religious ideals which brought various Shi’ite 
communities into revolt. This essentially created “polyglot armies, including Turkish slave 
                                                          
12 Hugh Kennedy, "Central Government and Provincial Élites in the Early 'Abbāsid Caliphate," Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, 44, no. 1 (1981): 26. 
 
13 Ibid., 27. It is curious to note that the Abbasid military favoured the Khurasanian troops in volatile areas, 
whereas the militias were used and subordinate to their immediate emir, suggesting that the Abbasids did not favour 
the idea of a standing army aside from their use of the Khurasani. 
 
14 Ibid., 31. Kennedy asserts that the “local Arab militia, not tribal followings, was the main force in the 
country”: see page 32. It is curious to note how Kennedy suggests the militias prevented the caliphs from 
establishing military dictatorships, as the composition and recruitment methods of the army itself prevented him 
from doing so, due in large part to the various allegiances of the local militias. 
 
15 It appears the Khurasani troops were only used in times of extreme necessity. Otherwise, the Abbasid 
army used locally drawn troops, making the main force of the country the militias. For more on this, see Hugh 
Kennedy, "Central Government and Provincial Élites in the Early 'Abbāsid Caliphate," 35. Within the Abbasid 
Dynasty, garrison towns in Iraq eventually gave way to the Khurasani troops due to the increase in urban life and 
trade, yet in Syria, garrison towns of local militias held their position and thus prevented the dissolution of locally 
formed Abbasid forces, loyal to various emirs. For more on this, see Kenneth M. Setton, ed. A History of the 
Crusades: The First Hundred Years. Vol. 1. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press (1969): 82. 
 
16 Daniel Pipes, "Black Soldiers in Early Muslim Armies," The International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 13, no. 1 (1980): 94. In regards to the rise of the Turk in Abbasid military composition, a product of the civil 
war between Harun ar-Rashid’s sons Al-Ma’mun and al’Amin, see Kenneth M. Setton, ed. A History of the 
Crusades: The First Hundred Years, 82. 
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troops that lacked cohesive unity,” comprised of Persians, non-Arab Muslims, Shi’ite supporters, 
and local militias.17 
Ottoman forces seem to have been constructed in very different ways, similar to 
contemporary European forces at the time, yet different when looking at its individual 
characteristics. The main force of the army consisted of the Sipahi (Persian, “army”), which were 
cavalrymen, in contrast to the infantrymen, later eclipsed by corps such as the Janissaries.18 
These cavalry warriors, while under the direct authority of the sultan, were garrisoned under “the 
supreme command of the provincial governor who called them to the colours when need for a 
campaign arose, although in later times, at least, it was possible to compound for absence by a 
financial payment,” showing a sense of feudal-ness as seen in the Abbasid period.19 Indeed, most 
of the Ottoman army, before encountering trained European armies, was comprised of feudal 
forces acting on behalf of involved emirs, “since the élite force of the Janissaries was a 
numerically restricted one.”20 They were later replaced by the rise of the sipahi in order to 
counter the effectiveness of European knights against Muslim feudal forces.21 These initial 
                                                          
17 Christopher Tyerman, The World of the Crusades (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 36. 
 
18 Bosworth, C.E., Temimi, Abdeljelil and Haig, T.W, “Sipāhī,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed, Ed: P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (2012): 1. 
 
19 It is interesting to note the qualities which these Sipahis shared with feudal Europe, as Bosworth states: 
“but since the land grants could only descend hereditarily to the sons or descendants of sipāhīs or d̲j̲ebelis, who had 
normally been brought up to the profession of arms and were capable of performing military service, a level of 
competence could be maintained. On a sipāhī’s death, his land grant usually passed to his son, although if the latter 
was still a minor, his required military service had to be performed by a d̲j̲ebeli substitute. If there was no heir at all 
or no capable heir, the grant reverted to the state, with its revenues collected ad interim by the mewḳūfātči̊ [q.v.], 
and it could then be granted out subsequently to some other deserving warrior”. For more on this, see Bosworth, 
C.E., Temimi, Abdeljelil and Haig, T.W, “Sipāhī,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed, Ed: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, 
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (2012): 2. 
 
20 Bosworth, C.E., Temimi, Abdeljelil and Haig, T.W, “Sipāhī,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (2012): 3. 
 
21 It seems as though the idea of feudal land-grants in exchange for military service was incorporated into 
the Ottoman world via Europe and the Byzantine empire, where “sipahis (cavalrymen) who composed the main 
force of the Ottoman army were given timars in the villages throughout the newly conquered country”. Inalcik, 
Halil. "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", Studia Islamica, no. 2 (1954): 107. For more on Sipāhī soldiers, the 
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feudal forces formed the bulk of Ottoman armies before the rise of the sipahi, based on a system 
of timars and ziamet that indicated the individuals’ rank in the army, across Anatolia which was 
utilized as a necessity,22 which outlined future military service required by the Sultan depending 
on how much land they were granted.23 This system was used by the predecessors of Murad I, 
where the Ottoman military was dependant on “the military services provided, on a voluntary 
basis, by Turkmen horsemen and border raiders, who served under semi-independent 
commanders of the frontier districts.”24 However, beginning with the reign of Murad I (1362 – 
1389), a standing military comprised of professional troops slowly began to take form, 
threatening the balance of power held by Turkish military families, frontier commanders, and the 
sultan.25 Murad became systematically less reliant on “ghazi volunteers and more on regular 
cavalry (sipahis) supported by land assignments,” causing feudal forces to largely disperse back 
                                                          
backbone of the Ottoman forces and beginning of the standing army, see Steven Runciman, The Fall of 
Constantinople 1453 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1965), 35. For more on the system of timars used to 
regulate the numbers of the sipahi cavalry, see Ágoston, Gábor  “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire 
and Russia, 1500–1800”, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12, no. 2 (2011): 282. 
 
22 “The Ottoman state developed its distinct tīmār organization, apparently borrowing in its successive 
periods of expansion elements from each of these [Byzantine, Western Europe, the Islamic States, the Turco-
Mongol states] feudal systems.” Note the emulation, albeit a changed form, of Abbasid feudal forces. For more on 
this, see Inalcik, H., “Tīmār”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2. For more or Timars and Ziamets, see Steven Runciman, 
The Fall of Constantinople 1453, 35. 
 
23 Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Military Organization (up to 1800),” The Encyclopedia of War (2011): 1. 
 
24 Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1. For more on the composition of these feudal 
forces, as well as the volunteer corps fighting along the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire in the 14th century, see 
Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization vol. 2 (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 424. For the transition of the Ottoman military from nomadic cavalry 
units to a standing army, paid by the Sultan during the mid-fourteenth-century, see Steven Runciman, The Fall of 
Constantinople 1453, 35. 
 
25 This standing army incorporated troops such as the Yeñi Čeri (Janissaries), which caused significant 
upheaval between the new military order and the one which it was trying desperately to modernize in the face of 
trained European forces, namely, nomadic volunteer forces raised by independent emirs. For more on this, see 
Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri”, 1-2. This resistance to the growing power of the standing military, largely signified by 
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into the population, thus creating the basis of the Ottoman standing military.26 This exodus of 
feudal forces could also be a consequence of Ottoman economic, social, and monetary reforms 
utilized in the 16th century as part of their military revival, causing an emphasis on a standing 
military in order to release people back into the population.27 Indeed, the introduction of the 
timar system “provided the Ottoman sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with a 
standing provincial cavalry army of 50,000–80,000 strong, while relieving the central Ottoman 
bureaucracy of the burden of revenue-raising and paying military salaries.”28 This modernization 
of Ottoman forces, including the creation of permanently salaried and mobilized troops at the 
sultan’s command, served a twofold purpose: firstly, it acted to negate the effectiveness of the 
Frankish knight on the battlefield, who easily out-skilled volunteer cavalrymen of the old 
military institutions in terms of weaponry and tactics, while secondly, it served as “an essential 
tool in combating centrifugal tendencies among the Turkmen beys.”29 These permanently 
                                                          
26 It is also essential to note the military units sent to the sultan on demand by Christian territories which 
had submitted to a vassal state, yet had not converted to Islam, as they were used in campaigns of the Ottoman 
empire during the expansion into the Balkans. For more on this, see Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 
426. For information on Byzantium’s vassalage to Murad I under Emperor John V of Constantinople, see Steven 
Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453, 36. For more information on the role of Murad I in the modernization 
of the Ottoman forces, see Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Military Organization (up to 1800),” 1. 
 
27 For more on the Ottoman social reforms, which enabled the empire to utilize more manpower in other 
sectors of society now that a standing army was formed, see Ágoston, Gábor. “Military Transformation in the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800”, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12, no. 2 (2011): 
282. 
 
28 Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Military Organization (up to 1800),” 3. This number of Ottoman cavalry is 
used as well in Ágoston, Gábor. “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800”, 282. 
 
29 The need for a standing military, as opposed to the feudal forces raised and utilized by various 
commanders along the frontier, became more apparent by the 1360’s Ottoman conquests of the Balkans, where 
interaction with mobilized European forces led them to modernize their land forces in order to subjugate the Balkan 
powers. For more on this, see Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri,” 2. The main difference between these the feudal forces and 
the new standing military, aside from their loyalty to the Sultan, was the permanent employment of the former. For 
more on this, see Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri”, 3. For more on the ties between Janissary troops and the Sultan 
following the rule of Murad I and Bayazid, see Gilles Veinstein, "On the Ottoman Janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth 
Centuries)", Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500-2000, ed. Zürcher Erik-Jan 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 121. 
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salaried troops, including the fledgling Janissary corps, came to be distinguished against those 
more nomadic factions of Ottoman forces due to their constant mobilization or permanent 
payment at the hands of the sultans.30 Beginning under Murad I, these Janissary units slowly 
began to take precedence in the Ottoman military, until by the 15th century they came into “a 
more specialised role as troops trained for the assault of fortified places,”31 largely due to their 
“specific ability to act as a monolithic and compact block in the final assault.”32 The significance 
of the Janissaries began to grow, especially during the 15th century following the conquest of 
Constantinople, as they gradually overtook the role of the traditional azabs, “relegating them to 
garrison service.”33 Indeed, Sultan Bayezid (1389 – 1402) expanded the Janissary corps with the 
sole intention of creating an army that could hold its own against any coalition force from 
Europe,34 increasing the number of Janissary troops to 13,000 by the end of his reign, “a very 
high level for a standing army of the time.”35 By the beginning of the 17th century, the role of the 
Janissary corps, and by extension, the salaried troops of the Ottoman Empire, completely 
removed the once existing feudal forces “as the indispensable operational core of the Ottoman 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 116. For the origins of the Janissary corps, a product of the Pencyek and Devsirme, see pages 121-
123. For the differences, including monetary payment, between the Janissary corps and the nomadic/feudal forces 
used by the Ottomans before Murad I, see page 127. For more on the origin of the Janissary corps, founded in 
1370’s, see Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Military Organization (up to 1800),” 2. 
 
31 Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri”, 3-4. See also Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 426.  
 
32 Gilles Veinstein, "On the Ottoman Janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth Centuries)," 117. 
 
33 Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Military Organization (up to 1800),” 1-2. For more on the role of the azabs, a 
remnant of the militia from early Ottoman military personnel who were eclipsed, and ultimately replaced by the 
Janissaries, see Ágoston, Gábor “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800,” 293. 
 
34 Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri,” 7. It is curious to note the importance of the Janissary Corps; the swelling of 
their numbers was a measure used in the 16th century to counterbalance the Hapsburg superiority in firepower in the 
war for Hungary. For more on this role, see Ágoston Gábor, “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia, 1500–1800,” 284. 
 
35 Gilles Veinstein, "On the Ottoman Janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth Centuries)," 118. 
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army.”36 This is not to say, however, that infantry became the most important force in Ottoman 
armies; cavalry units such as the Akinci played a vital role, especially in Suleiman I’s conquest of 
Hungary, and greatly outnumbered the Janissary units.37 Yet even these cavalry units followed 
the trend of permanent salaried troops, accompanying the Yeñi Čeri as the fundamental basis for 
the standing army. 
Ottoman military development during the 15th to 17th centuries played a large part in its 
conquest into Europe, as well as in the centralization of power in the hands of the Sultan, largely 
due to the close ties between the Yeñi Čeri units and himself.38 As Marshall Hogdson states, 
“Ottoman absolutism built upon the tradition of looking upon the central power, including all its 
administrative branches, as one great army; and of regarding this army as at the personal service 
of the monarch.”39 Indeed, “no longer dependent on steppe nomadic economy and culture, the 
Ottoman polity was settled, confident and accommodating, centered on loyalty to the  ruling 
dynasty and its religion, not on origins, ethnicity or past associations.”40 Ottoman military 
dominance in Anatolia, as well as in eastern Europe, can be examined in light of the Sultan’s 
centralized government, which enabled him to have “more control over their [Ottoman] empire’s 
resources and the means of organized violence.”41 This could not be further removed from the 
                                                          
36 Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri,” 9. For the role of the Janissary corps in securing the power of the Sultan, see 
Gilles Veinstein, "On the Ottoman Janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth Centuries)," 117. 
 
37 Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Military Organization (up to 1800),” 1-2. 
 
 
38 Gilles Veinstein, "On the Ottoman Janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth Centuries)," 116-117. 
 
39 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 99. 
 
40 Christopher Tyerman, The World of the Crusades (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 398. 
 
41 Ottoman dominance in the 16th century, in light of power centralization and military reforms, was 
unmatched in either its European or Asian rivals. This was later to be eclipsed by their Russian adversaries in the 
18th century. For more on this, see Ágoston, Gábor. “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 
1500–1800,” 282. 
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feudal-like military and political composition of the Abbasids, and for the reasons submitted 
below, Ottoman sovereignty can be analyzed.  
Abbasid military institutions were largely comprised of several political, religious, and 
demographic entities in their formative years leading to the downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty. 
These included Shi’ite factions, forces and garrisons local to emirs, and Persian sympathizers in 
light of Arabo-centric ideologies prevalent in the Muslim world. Khurasanian troops played a 
huge part in the Abbasids’ rise to power, forming what can be called a proto-standing army in the 
Muslim world, yet they failed to dislodge local forces as the backbone of Abbasid military 
policies.  
These factors outline the first difference between Ottoman and Abbasid military 
formation, although both had the humble beginnings of a feudal-like military: new military 
groups in the Abbasid world, such as the Khurasani, failed to permeate into existing military 
formations, thus limiting their effectiveness against foreign and domestic rivals.42 Innovative 
military branches in the Ottoman empire, such as the introduction of the Yeñi Čeri, were exposed 
to resistance from existing military families in Anatolia, yet gradually came to dominate the 
military, expelling the feudal mentality that had been relevant to Ottoman military foundations 
since its beginnings. Due to this, “irregular ghazi troops had tended gradually to recede into the 
general herding and peasant population…With their changed social position, their attitudes 
changed; well established themselves, there were ready to look for a heroic chief, more ready to 
accept an established monarch. At the same time, their power was diluted.”43 This leads into the 
                                                          
 
42 The weaknesses of the Abbasid Dynasty in this paper is being viewed from an internal/military 
perspective; this is not to negate the inter-caliphal disputes which greatly weakened the Abbasids, such as the 
pressures form the Fatimids, Frankish Counties in the Middle East, and Turkic pressures. For more on these, see 
Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453, 24. 
 
43 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 100. See also Murphey, R., “Yeñi Čeri,” 2-3. 
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second difference between Abbasid and Ottoman practices that lead to ultimate Ottoman 
supremacy: the formation of a standing military, initially comprised of slaves loyal only to the 
throne, which allowed Ottoman sultans to centralize power at the expense of the rival Turkic 
beys.44 In essence, the Janissary corps allowed the sultan to have a “state commission army or, to 
be more accurate, a sultan’s army,” increasing his power while becoming less dependent on 
feudal forces.45  Although the mentality of the ghazi remained along the frontiers of the Ottoman 
world, “their personnel had gradually ceased to be drawn from Muslim adventurers and 
hereditary frontiersmen,” giving way to professional standing armies newly utilized from the 
time of Murad I onwards.46  Abbasid caliphs lacked centralized authority, primarily due to their 
armies consisting of feudal and garrison forces loyal to a plethora of regional commanders, 
compelling the caliph to contend with local emirs in exchange for military support.47 This same 
pattern can be seen if one analyses the turbulent years between 1617-1730, where seven out of 
ten Sultans were deposed, leading to a collapse in the Ottoman war machine due to the 
emergence of third party “local power brokers,” thus diminishing the capability of the empire to 
face external threats as it had in the 15th century.48 In essence, Ottoman capabilities of 
centralizing power proved essential to their military dominance in both Europe and Asia. 
                                                          
 
44 Ibid., 102. 
 
45 Gilles Veinstein, "On the Ottoman Janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth Centuries)," 121. 
 
46 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 100. 
 
47 “As the Caliphs power declined that of his Turkish vassals increased”. For the decrease in power of the 
Abbasid Caliph, including the rise of the Ghaznavids in India, see Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 
1453, 24. 
 
48 For more on the collapse during the 17th century, see Ágoston, Gábor, “Military Transformation in the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800,” 284. 
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The final difference this paper proposes between Abbasid and Ottoman military styles 
and composition pertains to external influences. The Abbasid military continued to have 
relations, peaceful or not, with Byzantine and Western forces until its collapse in 1558 at the 
hands of the Mongols. Despite this interaction, Muslim forces did not stray from regionally 
divided factions, staying largely dependent on the goodwill of regional emirs and their forces to 
field an army. The Ottomans, however, once having captured Edirne and beginning their 
conquest into the Balkans, began a systematic modernization of their army, including land-
holding grants adopted from the Byzantine world and the formation of permanent salaried troops, 
in order to contend with the forces of Christendom.49 In fact, this adaptation to and emulation of 
European styles of fighting can be attributed to the rise of the Yeñi Čeri corps as the new 
backbone of the Ottoman standing army.50 This adaptation manifested not only in recruitment 
patters and tactics, but also in weapons. By the 15th century, “under Murad II they began to use 
matchlock arquebuses, called tufek,” a tactic of the west.51 Thus, the supremacy that the Ottoman 
military machine enjoyed can largely be attributed to martial developments which centralized 
power at the hands of the caliph while modernizing in the face of foreign adversaries. In the 
words of Marshall Hodgson, “the [Ottoman] army has been called the ‘ruling institution,’ a term 
                                                          
49 These parallels transcend military fundamental similarities, as Byzantine and Ottoman politics were quite 
intermarried during Byzantine vassalage to the Ottomans. For more on this, see Christopher Tyerman, The World of 
the Crusades, 399. 
 
50 For more on Ottoman emulation of European styles of fighting, including tactics and weaponry, see 
Gilles Veinstein, "On the Ottoman Janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth Centuries)," 116. 
 
51 Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Military Organization (up to 1800),” 1-2. This exposure to Western military 
tactics and armies can also be contributed to the conquest of Hungary; for more on this, see Ágoston, Gábor. 
“Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800,” 294. 
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that allows for the presence within it both of bureaucrats and of military, wielding all central 
power as one block.”52 
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52 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 101. It is curious to note the role which Ottoman military 
commanders played in social settings as well, as they were responsible for “maintaining law and order in the 
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